Both Bruno de Finetti This work demonstrates that Bayesian-probability propositions can be falsified, and so meet an empirical criterion of Charles S. (This falsifiability-criterion was popularized by Karl Popper.Since individuals act according to different probability judgments, these agents' probabilities are "personal" (but amenable to objective study).Personal probabilities are problematic for science and for some applications where decision-makers lack the knowledge or time to specify an informed probability-distribution (on which they are prepared to act).To meet the needs of science and of human limitations, Bayesian statisticians have developed "objective" methods for specifying prior probabilities.Following the work on expected utility theory of Ramsey and von Neumann, decision-theorists have accounted for rational behavior using a probability distribution for the agent.Johann Pfanzagl completed the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by providing an axiomatization of subjective probability and utility, a task left uncompleted by von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern: their original theory supposed that all the agents had the same probability distribution, as a convenience.It is true that in consistency a personalist could abandon the Bayesian model of learning from experience.Salt could lose its savour." In fact, there are non-Bayesian updating rules that also avoid Dutch books (as discussed in the literature on "probability kinematics" A decision-theoretic justification of the use of Bayesian inference (and hence of Bayesian probabilities) was given by Abraham Wald, who proved that every admissible statistical procedure is either a Bayesian procedure or a limit of Bayesian procedures.
The use of Bayesian probabilities as the basis of Bayesian inference has been supported by several arguments, such as Cox axioms, the Dutch book argument, arguments based on decision theory and de Finetti's theorem. Cox showed that Bayesian updating follows from several axioms, including two functional equations and a hypothesis of differentiability.
Each of these methods has been useful in Bayesian practice.
Indeed, methods for constructing "objective" (alternatively, "default" or "ignorance") priors have been developed by avowed subjective (or "personal") Bayesians like James Berger (Duke University) and José-Miguel Bernardo (Universitat de València), simply because such priors are needed for Bayesian practice, particularly in science.
A Dutch book is made when a clever gambler places a set of bets that guarantee a profit, no matter what the outcome of the bets.
If a bookmaker follows the rules of the Bayesian calculus in the construction of his odds, a Dutch book cannot be made.